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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

. I:

RODNEY M. LARSEN,
Plaimtiff-Appellant,
. i

Case No.

vs.

12413

EYA FREE KELLY,
Defendant-Repsondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
II

STAT.BJMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This i8 an action to recover damages for willful refu~al to perform a contract to sell real property.

11

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

11

The case wa8 tried to the Court. Defendant was
gTanted a judgment of no cause of action. Defendant sub111itkd proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law

1

to which Plaintiff objected. After discussion betwee:
the Court and counsel for both parties - Defandant wa.
instructed to prepare amended findings which he fai!e<
to do. Sometime thereafter, by inadvertence, the Cour
signed and filed the findings originally submitted to Ii
Thereafter at Plaintiff's request, for the purpose
facilitating this appeal, the Court signed an Ord~·
adopting the findings signed by inadvertance as the fina
ings of the court in this case.
111

Plaintiff made a motion to amend the decision 01
Judge Sawaya or in the alternative for a new trial, whid
motion was denied.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and judg
ment in his favor on undisputed facts, or that failing,a
new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant listed property belonging to her at
2870-78 South 3rd East, Salt Lake City, Utah, hereinafter
referred to as Defendant's property, for sale with Moone;
Real Estate, a realtor (R. 93 line 5-7). Enoch Bantistaai
agent for Mooney contacted Plaintiff who offered 1
purchase said property, subject to financing for
$56,000.00 (R. 93 line 8-19). Payment was to be madeb;
transferring Plaintiff's equity in a property at 320 Clar~
1

'
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Stred, hereinafter referred to as the Clark Street
Property for an assigned value of $10,000.00; by Plaintiff's assuming or paying the obligations of Defendant
whid1 encumbered said property and by payment of the
balance, then estimated to be $18,000.00 in cash. It
further rPcited that payment and possession was to be on
or before April 15, 1965. fJ.'he exact terms of said offer
are more fully set forth in Plaintiff's Exhrbit P-1 entitled Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase
which was received in evidence and which was at that
time completed through line 51, including Plaintiff's signature. Defendant responded by adding the items on P-1
after line 51 including the list attached thereto and signing her name just above line 53. Plaintiff accepted that
agreement by signing on the same line and the parties
"ach receipted for copies of the completed agreement.
The items added by Defendant included a reiteration of
the price of $56,000.00, a dovmpayment of $18,000.00 and
$10,000.00 for the Clark Street equity. They further
provided that the home was to be completed by
finishing the items lised on the attached sheet within 10
rlays after a loan commitment was given by the bank on
Defendant's property. They further provided that a
written appraisal was to be obtained from an authorized
lending institution on the Clark Street property in at
least the amount of $35,000.00 (Ex. P-1.)
On the strength of that agreement Plaintiff applied
for a loan on Defendant's property (R. 110 line 23 to R.
l l l li1w 9). Plaintiff obtained a loan commitment subjPd to a pledged savings account in the later part of
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May, 1965. He, in the company of Enoch Bautista, th~
went to Defendant's home and advised her of the !oar
commitment .and the pledged savings account (R. 111 llni
13 to R. 112 line 15; R. 95 line 21 to R. 96 line 15; andR
99 line 7-28). Defendant testified variously that she ru~
not object to the proposed pledged savings account as sn1
did not need the money immediately and on several oe
casions that as a result of that meeting the transactio~
was on-going (R. 99 line 7-28 and R. 146 line 19 to R.14i
line 20). Plaintiff the immediately, within the lO-da1
period and at substantial expense completed the items
listed by Defendant on Exhibit P-1 respecting the Clari
Street Property (R. 123 line 11-35 and R. 112line11-18).
Plaintiff or Defendant's realtor then set up a mee1ingpre.
paratory to closing the transaction at the realtors offiCI'
At the outset of that meeting Defendant's attorney, Lam.
bert Gibson, announced there was no deal but that Defend.
ant would be receptive to a "decent" deal (R. 10 line 9-ll
andR. H3lines13-22). Plaintiff had prior to that meetini
obtained a sale of Defendant's property to Tena Birrell
(R. 115 line 28 to R. 116 line 14). After the meeting he
formalized that sale with an Earnest Money Receipt and
Offer to Purchase (Exhibit P-4) at which time he ob·
tained Earnest Money of $7,500.00. A copy of that check
which was paid and later of necessity returned, was re·
ceived as Exhibit P-5. He also obtained an appraisal on
the Clark Street Property in the specified amount (Exhibit P-3).
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ARGUM1£N1'
POINT I
IF THE CONTRACT COULD ONLY BE PERFORMED WITHIN A LIMITED TIME AS CLAIMED
BY DEFENDANT, DEFENDANT MODIFIED THAT
TIME OR IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THE CONTINUED VALIDITY OF THE CONTRACT BY HER
CONDUCT IN THE LATTER PART OF MAY 1965
AND PLAINTIFF WAS EXCUSED FROM FURTHER
PERFORMANCE AFTER DEFENDANT'S PRECIPITOUS TERMINATION APPROXIMATELY ONE OR
TWO WEEKS LATER.

'l'he gist of Plaintiff's case is simply that in the
latter part of May, 1965, at a time after Defendant now
claims Plaintiff failed to perform as required by the contract, Plaintiff met with Defendant and her real estate
agent and advised her that he had obtained a loan
commitment; that he proposed to her that she accept as
part payment a pledged savings account in the amount
of $5,000.00; that she acquiesced or at least did not object
to the pledged savings account and considered the
agreement on-going and knew or expected that Plaitiff
would incur expense and continue to work complete
the trasaction; that on thait understanding Plaintiff
expended substantial sums to complete the Clark Street
Property in accordance with Defendant's instructions.
On the occasion of their very next meeting approximately
one or two weeks later, called for the purpose of closing
the loan and the sale contemplated by the contract, Defendant by her attorney at the outset of that meeting
annolmced that there was no deal, that Defendant was
terminating the contract beca:use of a failure to close by
April 15, approximately one and one-half months earlier.
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He then proposed that Defendant was amenable to
better or as he put it a, "decent" deal.
As a result of Defendant's deliberate and malicio
renege - if "renege" is a strong enough term to descril
what was more than a refusal to complete a deal becalli
of a change of position or some kind of dissatisfacfa
with Plaintiff's perfonnance but was in reality a
attempt to extort a more advantageous deal - Plainti!
lost a then negotiated sale of Defendant's property for
profit of $4,500.00 and later lost, in a mortgage fon
closure, his equity in the Clark Street Property to whit
the parties has assigned a value of $10,000.00 in thei
agreement.
The evidence that supports the facts upon which~·
foregoing argument is dependent is all either undisput~
agreed upon or is the testimony of Defendant.
Defendant testified concerning a conversation witl
Plaintiff and her realtor in the latter part of May, 19&i
wherein they advised her that Plaintiff had obtained i
loan commitment and wherein Plaintiff proposed tha1
she accept an escrowed savings account of $5,000.00 ai
part payment; she said generally she didn't object; tha:
it was all right; that it was decided that the offer wouk
be accepted according to when the house was completed:
and that as a result of that conversation she considerea
the transaction to be on-going. She further testified tha1
she knew Plaintiff would be and was working to compleff
the items-on-the house in accordance with the requirr·
men ts of their agreement and to complete the loan tram
6

ad ion ( H. 95 line 22-30; H. 9G line 7-17 ; R. 99 line 7-28
and R 141i line 19 to R. 147 line 20). Plaintiff testified to
till' same thing Pxcept he said Defendant indicated affinnatively that the pledged savings was acceptable (R.
111line18 to R. 112 line 18 and R. 131line10-22). That
Plaintiff expended substantial sums to complete the
house in accordance with Defendant's instruction is not
disputed. Plaintiff's testimony is at R. 123 line 11-25.
Respecting the meeting in Mooney's office and the
tinH' interval between that and the meeting of the parties,
there is no substantial dispute. Mrs. Kelly said she didn't
remember bnt it would have been at least two weeks (R.
lOS line 1-5). Plaintiff testified the first meeting was
betwel.•n the 15th and 25th of May (R. 111line18-20) and
the meeting in the Realtor's office was in the first part
of June (R. 114 line 9-13). The parties also agreed that
Defendant by her attorney terminated said agreement
abruptly. Mrs. Kelly testifed that her attorney said the
agreement \Vas null and void but they were open to a
decent deal (R. 107 line 9-14). Plaintiff testified the same
(Rll4 line 13-22), and that Defendant through her attorney stated that the reason the eontract was null and void
was that it had not been performed by the 15th of
April deadline (R. 114 line 23-27).
The legal propositions upon which Plaintiff's arguuwnt depends are :
1. Defondant conld orally or by her conduct modify
\hp written agreement. See 30 Am. Jnr. 2d 203 entitled
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"Evidence" subsection 1063 entitled "Subsequent Par,
Agreement or .Modifications"

. "l~ ~e absence of a statute providing othe1
wise, it i~ conw~etent for the parties to a sirupi
c<;>~tract m wr~tmg, ?efore any breach of its prr,
visions, to waJ.ve, dissolve, or abandon it, or
~dd to, change, or modify it or vary or quati!1
its terms orally or in writing, and thus make;
new contract."
1,

2. Defendant is estop~d by her conduct at the rneit
ing of the parties in the latter part of .May to deny th•
continuing validity of the the agreement. 28 Am. Jur. i~
674, entitled "Estoppel" and waiver subsection 57 en
titled "Acquiescence", says:
"The rule is that where a party with full know
ledge, or with sufficient notice or means of knowl
edge, of his rights and of all the material fact/,
remains inactive for a considerable time or a~
stains from impeaching a contract or transaction,
or freely does what amounts to a recognition
thereof as existing, or acts in a manner inconsistent with its repudiation and so as to affect or
interfere with the relation and situation of the
parties, so that the other party is induced to su~
pose that it is recognized, this amounts t~ ~·
quiescense and the transaction, although or1gm
ally impeachable, become unimpeachable."
For Utah Cases see Caldwell v. Anschutz Drilling Co.,lJ
Utah 2d 177, 369 P 2d 964, Hilton v. Sloan et al, 37 Utal
359, 108 Pac. 689, Utah State Bldg. Commission v
Great American Indemnity Co., 105 Utah 11, 140 P 2°
763 and Tanner v. Provo Reservoir Co. 76 Utah 335, 28~1
Pac. 151.
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3. Defendant's anticipatory breach or recission of
the contract excuses Plaintiff's further performance or
show of performance. See 17 Am.Jur.2d 912, entitled
"Contracts", subsection 449 entitled "Repudiation or
Renunciation".
''N" early all the courts considering the question
have reached the conclusion that a renunciation or
repudiation of a contract before the time for performance, which amounts to a refusal to perform
it at any time, gives the adverse party the option
to treat the entire contract as broken and to sue
immediately for damages as for a total breach.
There is no necessity in such case for a tender
performance, or compliance with conditions precedent, or waiting for the time of performance to
arrive, a1though this is optional. No notice need
be given that repudiation is treated as a breach."
POINT IL
DEFENDANT WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN RESCINDING THE AGREEMENT REPRESENTED BY
EXHIBIT P-1.

While Plaintiff intends to negate the proposition
that Defendant was entitled to rescind, he does not intend
to waive or in any way relieve Defendant of the burden
of providing that she was entitled to rescind, in the event
the court finds that she had that burden and that such enitlernent to rescind is esssential to her defense and the
decision of the trial court.
Defendant claims Plaintiff did not perform within
the time provided in the contract for payment. P answers
- In addition to the arguments heretofore made regard-
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ing estoppel and modification of that agreement, Plain
tiff claims Defendant's Counter-Offer, that part of Ex
hibi t P-1 after line 51, modified that time when it provide,!
for another indetenninate time to-wit:
"Completion of the home 10 days after a loau
commitment, etc."
Defendant's attorney claims that she did not agree
to the pledged savings account but that is contrary ti
Plaintiff's own testimony (R. 95 line 23-30, R. 96 line
7-17, R. 99 line 7-28 and R. 14G line 19 to R. 147 line 20).
Plaintiff testified that if Defendant had objected to the
pledged savings account, he was prepared to go forwarn
with the deal and that he would take the pledged saving>
account (R. 126 line 9 to R.127 line 8).
Defendant's attorney has claimed that the Clari
Street Property was not completed in accordance witl1
the contract - but Defendant was unable, after warnin1
that it was important and after ample opportuniy, tote~
the court one item that was not completed (R. 97 line 1
to R. 98 line 5). She did claim that only the front yard
was landscaped and not the back or side yard (R. 97 line
1-10) but Exhibit P-1 on which the obligation to landscape depends provides :
"Seller to landscape and sprinkling system on

f rant of home" (emphasis added).

Plaintiff testified that all of the items were completea
and that he had not at the time of the trial been advised
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of any items not completed (R. 112 line 12-15 and R. 123
line 26 to R. 124 line 1). Plaintiff contends further that
the undisputed fact that Defendant did not simply reject
till' deal but wanted to continue the deal on better terms
io ('\·idPnce from which it may be inferred that the Clark
Stred Property was comvleted satisfactorily.
H there were non major items that were not complekd, Defendant was not justified in summarily terminating the contract without giving Plaintiff any kind of
opportunity to correct them. See 13 Am. Jur. 2d 97
entitled "Building Construction contracts" Section 101.

"However, before partial failure of performance
of one party will give the other the right of rescission, the act failed to be performed must go to
the root of the contract. There must be a substantial default on the part of the contractor in order
to justify rescission by the owner, and minor
omissions or slight departures from the letter of
the contract are not sufficient to justify rescission."
Also see Annotation at 107 ALR 1035 entitled
''Owner's Right to Rescind Building and Construction
Contract for Default of Contractor" which states the
general rule:
''Default of the contractor in minor details of a
building contract is not ground for its recission
by the owner. There must be substantial default
Wray v. Young (1922) 122 Wash. 330, 210 Pac.
794."
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.....,

Defendant ha::> claimed a right to rescind becau~·
Plaintiff did not tender the sum of $18,000.00 in cash.
P answern - First, Defendant by her precipitou,
termination did not give Plaintiff any opportunity
make such a tender, and excused him from it.
11.

Second, Plaintiff was ready, able and willing to pay t!J,
$56,000.00 for the property as agreed. The meeting at
w.hich Defendant abruptly terminated the contract wai
for the purpose of closing the transaction (R. 112 line 2~
to R. 113 line 1). Defendant was aware that Plaintiffwai
obtaining a loan to purchase her property (Exhibit p.1
is conditioned on Plaintiff's obtaining a loan commit
ment). While Defendant claims that she should not be
required to escrow a deed the closing was proceeding in
accordance with usual commercial procedures followed in
this community of which the court took judicial notice
(R. 149 line 24-28).

Third, Defendant's attorney has claimed that Plaintiff
was obligated to tender $18,000.00 even though that
amount exceeded Plaintiff's equity in her property after
application of the Clark Street Property. But Defendant
testified clearly that she only intended to get a total of
$56,000.00 (R. 1-!2 line 20-25). That the $18,000.00 was a
wrong estimate by Defendant of her equity is obviously
explained by the fact that Defendant was confused about
the extent to which her property was encumbered (R.
140line11toR.141line18).
Defendant also claims that the appraisal report on
the Clark Street Property mentioned in Exhibit P-l
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1rhich

is ih;elf Exhibit D-12 was not prepared until after

the abrupt termination.

Plaintiff contends first that it was not his obligation
to obtain the appraisal. Exhibit P-1 did not provide who
~hould obtain it. Defendant being the author of provision
should have the ambiguity construed against her; and
Second, Plaintiff was prevented and excused from
providing the appraisal by Defendant's abrupt termination.
Defendant has also claimed that the testimony of
Robert Ford that loan commitments are usually made
within two weeks of the appraisal report and that the
date of April 12, 1965 appears on the appraisal report
Exhibit D-12 indicates the conunitment must have been
made by April 26 and therefore Plaintiff had not performed within ten days of the loan commitment. Plaintiff contends, the testimony of Ford about usual time
intervals ( R. 155 line 17 -18), could hardly be said to
fairly contradict the direct testimony of Plaintiff that
the loan conunitment was in fact made in the latter part
of May 1965 (R. 111 line 6-9 and R. 112 line 17 and 18).
Moreover the trust deed and note Exhibits P-8 and 9
8how dates of May 25, 1965.
Perhaps more importantly all of the testimony indicates the meeting of the parties in Defendant's home was
in thP latter part of May, a time well after any right to
rescind for that reason had matured. The arguments
heretofore made concerning the modification of the
agreement by that meeting and/or the estoppel to deny
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the continuance of the contract after that meeting area~
1
applicable to defeat this afterthought of Defendan!'i
attorney.
·The foregoing arguments constitute a positive stale
ment of Plaintiff's disagreement with findings of lac:
number 5 through 12 and all of the conclusions of law'
and the Decree adopted by Judge Sawaya herein. Tlm
were stated particularly in Plaintiff's objection to pro
posed findings of fact, conclusions of law and Decrei
filed herein at the time of the motion for new trial (R.
73, 74 and 75).

POINT III.
THE EVIDENCE IS UNDISPUTED THAT '
PLAINTIFF SUFFERED DAMAGES IN THE SUM
OF $14,500.00.

Plaintiff testified that prior to Defendant's termination he had made a verbal arrangement to sell Defenuant's property for $60,500.00 or $4,500.00 more than h1
had agreed to pay Defendant for it. He later obtainedaTI
Earnest Money Agreement and $7 ,500.00 earnest mone!
which he had to return when it became clear that Defen·
ant would not perform her agreement. His testimony!1
reinforced by an appraisal report (Exhibit D-12), wh!eil
indicates Defendant's property had a value of $60,000.00
Plaintiff's testimony is at R. 115 line 1toR.117 linei.
There is no contradictory testimony.
Plaintiff further testified that he lost the Clad
Street Property through a mortgage foreclosure and tbal
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hi 8 financial difficulties began with the failure of this
i!Pal (R. 124: line 22-24). rrhe value of Plaintiff's equity
in the Clark Street Property was $10,000.00 according
to the Agreement of the parties (Exhibit P-1). That
value is reinforced by an appraisal report indicating a
value of $35,000.00 (Exhibit P-3) and Plaintiff's testimony that the amount for which it was foreclosed was
slightly less than $25,000.00 (R. 122 line 11-18). Again
there was no contradictory testimony.
Plaintiff contends that if the court finds that Defendant's abrupt termination was not justified, Plaintiff's damages in the amount of $14,500.00 were proved
without contradiction. The only items remaining that
would have to be decided by a trier of fact are the matter
of punitive damages, consequential damages arising
from Plaintiff's inability to pay his bills and from his
loss of credit reputation and attorney's fees. To avoid
the neeessity of a new trial on those matters Plaintiff
herewith offers to accept a Judgment in the sum of
$14,500.00 plus costs in full satisfaction of his claims
herein.

CONCLUSION
Defendant was not entitled to terminate her contract
with Plaintiff by any construction of the evidence. Plaintiff's damages incurred as a result of her wrongful
termination were uncontradicted and clearly proven. The
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judgment of the trial court should be reversed and Plain
tiff should be granted judgment in the sum of $1±,500.on
Respectfully submitted,
Gerald E. Nielson
840 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for PlaintiffAppellant
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